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You Can Get There From Here:
The Alaska Lands Act's Innovations
in the Law of Access Across Federal Lands
Steven P. Quarles*
Thomas R. Lundquist**
This article***presents recent developments in the law of access acrossfederal lands. After discussingfederal land accessprinciples in the western States, the authors examine the innovative
substantive access guaranteesand transportationor utility system
siting procedurescontainedin the Alaska NationalInterestLands
ConservationAct. Since most of these ANILCA provisions are
limited to federal lands in Alaska, the authors explore whether
similarprovisions applicable to federal lands in all States would
be advisable.

The federal government owns vast amounts of land in Alaska and the
Western States.1 Development and use of private lands adjacent to federal
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
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*** The authors are publishing a similar article. The Alaska Lands Act's Innovations
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publication.
1. The federal government owns nearly 32% of the lands in the United States, totaling over 726 million acres. Most of these federal lands are located in the Western states and
were part of the public domain acquired from foreign sovereigns. In many states, the federal
government owns over half of the land within the state-for example, Alaska (86%), Idaho
(63%), Nevada (85%), and Utah (64%). BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
REV.

PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS

1985, at 5 (1985).
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lands often requires access across federal lands. Access permission for
a right-of-way from the federal land-managing agency usually is necessary
where a road, transmission line or pipeline would cross federal lands. While
the federal land-managing agencies historically have granted such rightsof-way, since the advent of the environmental movement in the 1960's,
a number of impediments to securing access across federal lands have
arisen. This conflict between private property interests and environmental concerns led Congress to enact special access guarantees and procedures in the 1980 Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act
2
(ANILCA or Alaska Lands Act).
This article explores federal lands access issues, focusing on the innovative access provisions of the Alaska Lands Act. Part I provides a
brief background of the general law of access across federal lands and identifies the reasons why access issues came to the forefront in ANILCA.
In Parts II through V, the article explains in detail ANILCA's access and
transportation and utility system routing provisions, as implemented in
a 1986 Department of the Interior (Interior) rulemaking.3 Finally, Part
VI addresses whether these ANILCA provisions should be legislatively
extended to federal lands in states other than Alaska. Thus, this article
explores the extent to which the lament that "you can't get there from
here" holds true on public lands in and outside Alaska.
I.

BACKGROUND ON THE LAW OF ACCESS

ACROSS

FEDERAL LANDS

The federal lands are managed by a number of agencies and for a variety of purposes. In general, each federal land-managing agency has its own
statute(s) governing its land management responsibilities and its ability
to issue rights-of-way.
Three of the land-managing agencies are housed within Interior. The
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers the unreserved public
domain under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
{FLPMA).4 The National Park Service (NPS) manages the federal lands
that have been reserved as part of the National Park System under several
statutes.5 The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) manages the National
Wildlife Refuge System under the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act 6 and related authorities.
2. Act of December 2, 1980, Pub. L. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980). The majority of the
Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1982).
3. See 51 Fed. Reg. 31,619 (Sept. 4, 1986). These ANILCA rules are now codified at
43 C.F.R. Part 36 (1986). Minor corrections were published at 51 Fed. Reg. 36,011 (Oct. 8,
1986). Portions of the 43 C.F.R. Part 36 rules recently have been challenged in a suit brought
by environmental groups. See Trustees for Alaska v. Department of the Interior, No. A87-055
(D. Alaska filed Feb. 9, 1987).
4. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982). Title V of FLPMA governs right-of-way issuances
on BLM land. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1982). Rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines on
BLM lands are governed by section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
5. See 16 U.S.C. §§ I to 460 (1982). The principal NPS rights-of-way authorities are
found at 16 U.S.C. §§ 5, 79 (1982) and 23 U.S.C. § 317 (1982).
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1982).
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The Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture, is the other
major federal landowner. It administers the National Forest System under
several statutes.' Some NPS, FWS, BLM and Forest Service lands also
have been placed in other conservation-oriented land systems, such as the
8
National Wilderness Preservation System (Wilderness and the National
Wild and Scenic Rivers System,' which can further constrain access
opportunities.
Access into or across these extensive federal land systems often is
required to reach private lands which are surrounded by federal lands
(private inholdings) and to site rights-of-way. Through the early 1900's,
thought
such access generally was granted routinely either because it was
10
to be part of the public's implied license to use federal lands. Since the
advent of the modern environmental movement in the 1960's, however,
a number of impediments to securing access across federal lands have
arisen.
First, the government has increasingly dedicated federal land to conservation-oriented purposes. Access across such conservation lands often
is significantly restricted. The Wilderness Act, for example, virtually precludes motorized access or rights-of-way across Wilderness lands." The
National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act permits the FWS to issue
rights-of-way across units of the National Wildlife Refuge System only
when the rights-of-way are "compatible" with wildlife refuge purposes."
Within the National Park System, the NPS may grant rights-of-way under
a "public interest" standard only for specified purposes, such as transmission lines, and authority for some types of rights-of-way, such as oil and
gas pipelines, is lacking.'" Other statutes that provide direction for the
management of the federal conservation land systems also contain provi7. See id §§ 471-583 (1982). Rights-of-way across Forest Service lands are generally
governed by Title V of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1982).
8. The Wilderness Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982). Rights-of-way and
motorized access generally are prohibited in Wilderness areas under 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982).
9. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982). Rightsof-way through the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System are governed by 16 U.S.C. §
1284(g) (1982).
10. See Burford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890); Coggins, Evans & Johnson, The Law

of PublicRangeland ManagementI: The Extent and Distributionof FederalPower, 12 ENVTL.
L. 535, 588-93 (1982); Comment, Gamesmanship on the Checkerboard.The Recurring Problem of Access to Interlocked Public andPrivate Lands Located Within the Pacific Railroad
Land Grants, XVII LAND & WATER L. REV. 429, 432-35 (1982).

11. The most significant access restriction in the Wilderness Act is § 4(c), which provides that generally "there should be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport,
and no structure or installation within any such [Wilderness] area." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982);
see also id. §§ 1133(d), 1134 (1982).
12. Under the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd
(1982), the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to grant easements over Wildlife Refuge
lands for "powerlines, telephone lines, canals, ditches, pipelines, and roads ... [only when]
he determines that such uses are compatible with the purposes for which these areas are
established." Id. § 668dd(1)(B).
13. See id. §§ 5, 79 (1982).
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sions which severely 4constrain access opportunities in order to protect
conservation values.1
Second, even on federal lands managed for multiple uses, such as
Forest Service and BLM lands, the issuance of rights-of-way has become
more complicated. The obligation to maintain wilderness values until wilderness study lands have been adequately reviewed for possible inclusion
in the National Wilderness Preservation System may preclude access
across federal roadless areas. 5 With the enactment of federal environmental responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,16
the Forest Service and BLM have become more than passive grantors
of rights-of-way. Additionally, the enactment of Forest Service land use
planning responsibilities under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, as amended by the National Forest Management Act of 1976,11 and the enactment of BLM land use planning responsibilities under FLPMA' 8 also have prompted these agencies to decide the
appropriate access route and specify environmental constraints. While the
BLM and the Forest Service generally do grant some form of access,
ultimately the granting of rights-of-way across BLM and Forest Service
lands under Title V of19 FLPMA is discretionary, and there is no statutory
assurance of access.
Third, the 1979 Supreme Court decision in Leo Sheep Co. v. United
0
States,1
arguably suggest that the doctrine of easements by necessity
does not apply to federal lands. Application of that doctrine would require
that the government grant access across federal lands to the owner of
land surrounded by federal lands. Leo Sheep addressed the converse of
the issue examined in this article: access across private lands to reach
federal lands. The private and federal lands were held in a "checkerboard"
land ownership pattern which resulted from a railroad land grant. Because
of the checkerboard configuration, it was physically impossible for the
government to provide recreational access to a reservoir on public lands
without intruding on the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff brought an action to quiet title against the federal government, which had built a road
across the plaintiff's property to access the reservoir. The government
argued that it had a common law easement by necessity across the plain14. See generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE U.S., ANALYSIS OF
LAWS GOVERNING ACCESS ACROSS FEDERAL LANDS-OPTIONS FOR ACCESS IN ALASKA (1979).

15. Section 3(b) of the Wilderness Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to administer
"primitive" areas of the National Forest System to preserve wilderness values "until Congress has determined otherwise." 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1982). Legal difficulties in conducting the RARE II wilderness study program for national forests often have resulted in the
delay or denial of access across such primitive areas. See, e.g., California v. Block, 690 F.2d
753 (9th Cir. 1982).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4344 (1982).
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1982). In particular, the Forest Service planning requirements
are developed in id § 1604.
18. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1982). In particular, the BLM planning and rights-of-way
requirements are developed in id. §§ 1712, 1761-1771 (1982).
19. See FLPMA § 501(a). Since the relevant Secretary is merely "authorized to grant
...rights-of-way," access is not guaranteed. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1982).
20. 440 U.S. 668 (1979); cf. Comment, supra note 10.
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tiff's property. Rejecting the government's claim, the Court found the applicability of the common law doctrine of easements by necessity "somewhat strained," primarily because the government could rely upon its
power of eminent domain to gain access. Instead, the Court viewed the
issue solely as one of discerning congressional intent in enacting the orig21
inal federal land grant statute. A unanimous Court held that the federal
government had no implied right of recreational access across the private
lands. While the "tea leaves" of Leo Sheep are somewhat uncertain concerning implied access across federal lands, the case can be read to suggest that the common law doctrine of easements by necessity does not
apply against the federal government. Since the Court viewed the issue
of federal access across private lands as one to be resolved under statutory
law, it arguably hinted that private access across federal lands similarly
should be implied only to the extent consistent with congressional intent
22
in enacting land grant legislation.
Fourth, a year after the Leo Sheep decision, the United States Attorney General opined that inholders have no guarantee of access across
federal lands. On June 23, 1980, the Attorney General, Benjamin Civiletti, issued an opinion concerning the access rights of Burlington Northern
2
Inc. across a Wilderness study area in a national forest in Montana.. Relying in part on the exclusive congressional authority under the Property
Clause2' to dispose of federal land interests, and adopting the position that
the Court had perhaps implicitly accepted in Leo Sheep, the Civiletti Opinion concluded that the common law doctrine of easements by necessitywhich ordinarily assures some form of access across private lands-does
21
not operate on federal lands. Instead, the Civiletti Opinion stated that
claim on statutory authority. Further,
access
an
base
an inholder must
the Attorney General suggested that, in particular circumstances,
21. Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 681-82.
22. Though eminent domain ordinarily would not be available to a private landowner,
it can be argued that Leo Sheep-by phrasing the easement by necessity doctrine in terms
of transactions among "private landowner[s]" and by ultimately finding "the intent of Congress" to be determinative-obliquely confirmed that there are no easements of necessity
across federal lands and that private access rights can be implied only when access was intended by the Congress. Id at 681.
23. Rights-of-Way Across National Forests, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 26 (1980) [hereinafter
Civiletti Opinion].
24. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2,which provides in part: "The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting that territory
or other Property belonging to the United States ....
25. Civiletti Opinion, supra note 23, at 12, which states: "It is also my view that the
common law doctrine of easement by necessity does not apply to congressional disposition
of the public domain." The common law doctrine of easements by necessity has two main
variants: one which infers an easement across lands originally held under unity of title only
where the parties to the severance document appear to have contemplated access, and one
which is a judicial fiction implying access in all severance situations to favor the productive
use of lands, regardless of party intent. See 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §

410 (P. Rohan ed. 1979); 2 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 363 (J. Grimes ed. 1980 repl. vol. & Supp. 1981); 3 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
§ 793 (B. Jones (3d) ed. 1939 & Supp. 1986). In effect, the implied statutory access theory adopted by the Civiletti Opinion may be parallel to the first variant of easements
by necessity.
PROPERTY
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inholders may have access rights implied under federal land grant statutes- an "intent of Congress" theory that is somewhat analogous
to the
"intent of the parties" version of easements by necessity. Not all inholders
would have access rights under the statutory interpretation rules
the Attorney General provided for discerning the existence of such implied
ac2
6
cess rights. In the absence of an implied statutory access right,
the
Civiletti Opinion suggested that there is no true guarantee of access
across
federal lands; the inholder would be subject to agency discretion
in
authorizing access under FLPMA Title V or other applicable federal
law.
The Civiletti Opinion apparently still controls the federal litigating
position.
A final impediment to access has been the government's use of discretionary access authority to regulate indirectly the development
of nonfederal lands. By relying on the purported power to deny any
access,
several federal agencies have asserted the lesser power to condition
access to allow development only when it is consistent with the uses
of surrounding federal land." This access "handle" often supplies an effective
substitute for the regulation of development where Congress
has not
granted direct federal regulatory authority over private lands. Such
regulation often results in diminished development expectations.
As these impediments have arisen and shaped existing access law,
a corresponding concern has grown among private inholders that
they
could become landlocked by federal lands and be without adequate
access to their private lands. In many situations involving federal lands
in
western States, it may not be possible "to get there from here"
satisfactorily because of the substantive limits and administrative discretion
embodied in statutory access provisions applicable to federal lands. Congress
responded to these concerns by placing in ANILCA a variety of
unique
and revolutionary access-related provisions.2 8
26. Civiletti Opinion, supra note 23, at 14-15 (citations and footnotes
omitted), which
states:
To determine what rights have passed under federal law, it is necessary
to interpret the statute disposing of the land. It is a recognized
principle that
all federal grants must be construed in favor of the government "lest
enlarged to include more than what was expressly included. ". . .These they be
general
rules must not be applied to defeat the intent of Congress, however.
Supreme Court has stated that public grants are "not to be construed The
as to
defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is given either
expressly
or by necessary or fair implication... "
These rules dictate that if it is clear that Congress intended to grant
access, such access must be acknowledged, its scope consistent with the
purposes
for which the grant was made. An implied easement defined by the
actual intent of Congress must be distinguished from an easement by necessity,
which
relies on the presumed intent of the parties.
27. For example, 36 C.F.R. Subpart 913 (1986) controls the development
of non-federal
oil and gas within the National Park System by conditioning
access across federal lands.
28. In enacting the ANILCA Title XI access provisions, the Senate
mittees stated that they did "not agree with the arguments that existing and House comlaw is sufficient;"
therefore, they enacted Title XI "which supersedes rather than supplements
existing law."
S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245-46 (1979); H.R. REP.
No. 97, pt. I, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 237-38 (1979).
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ANILCA became the focal point for innovations in access law for
several reasons. ANILCA is the most significant federal conservation
measure in terms of acreage ever enacted, adding nearly 104 million acres
9
of "conservation system units" (CSU's) in Alaska, thereby doubling the
Refuge Systems, and triWildlife
size of the National Park and National
30
recognized that exCongress
System.
Wilderness
the
of
size
the
pling
isting law "allows only limited public access" across the massive CSU's,
and enacted specific access guarantees to ensure "full rights of access"
for CSU inholders.3 1 Also, recognizing that Alaska's "existing transportation and utility systems are in their embryonic stage of development,"
Congress provided for Alaska's economic growth by adopting "a procedure
than
for future siting of transportation facilities which supersedes rather
3
supplements existing law when such systems cross CSU lands." Finally, Congress enacted specific access guarantees across BLM and Forest
making it clear that
Service lands "to resolve any lingering questions by
33
non-Federal landowners have a right of access. "
In this article, ANILCA's access-related provisions are categorized
for analysis as follows: (1) access guarantees across CSU's (ANILCA §§
1110(a), 1110(b), 1111); (2) access guarantees across the National Forest
System and BLM lands (ANILCA § 1323); and (3) procedures and standards for approving transportation or utility systems (ANILCA §§
1101-1107). The sections below discuss the scope of these provisions and
significant implementing actions.
II.

ACCESS GUARANTEES AcRoss CONSERVATION SYSTEM UNITS

A. ANILCA § 1110(a)-Traditional,Non-Environmentally
Damaging Access
ANILCA § 1110(a) is the only ANILCA access provision which does
not require a permit for access; it authorizes certain access 4 methods in
CSU's unless and until prohibited by administrative action.1 This provision allows the use of snowmachines, motorboats, airplanes, and nonmotorized surface transportation methods such as dog sleds and horses

See 16
30.
TION OF

31.
32.
33.
34.

29. The term "conservation system unit" is defined in ANILCA § 102(4)
to mean:
any unit in Alaska of the National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge
System, National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, National Trails System, National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument including existing units, units established, designated, or expanded by or under
the provisions of this Act, additions to such units, and any such unit established,
designated, or expanded hereafter.
U.S.C. § 3102(4) (1982).
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES' IMPLEMENTATHE ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS CONSERVATION ACT (Apr. 19, 1982).
S. REP. No. 413, supra note 28, at 248.
Id at 245-46.
Id at 310.
ANILCA § 1110(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or other law, the Secretary
shall permit, on conservation system units, national recreation areas, and national conservation areas, and those public lands designated as [W]ilderness
study, the use of snowmachines (during periods of adequate snow cover, or
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in CSU's and other named areas for "traditional activities" and for travel
to and from villages and homesites. The provision's legislative history
reflects a congressional intent to authorize generally the use of these access methods-methods which require no permanent improvements on federal lands and cause little environmental injury. 5
In its 1986 rulemaking, Interior uniformly implemented and expanded upon ANILCA § 1110(a) access rights for all NPS and FWS lands and
certain BLM lands (for example, wilderness study lands) in Alaska subject to § 11 10(a).3 These rules broaden the statutory access guarantee by
allowing the use of motorboats, airplanes and nonmotorized surface transportation methods for any purpose on most Interior lands covered by §
11 10(a).37 No corresponding regulations have been issued for Forest Service lands subject to ANILCA § 1110(a). Consequently, the statutory
limitation that access must be for "traditional activities" or "travel to
frozen river conditions in the case of wild and scenic rivers), motorboats,
airplanes, and nonmotorized surface transportation methods for traditional activities (where such activities are permitted by this Act or other law) and for
travel to and from villages and homesites. Such use shall be subject to
reasonable regulations by the Secretary to protect the natural and other values
of the conservation system units, national recreation areas, and national conservation areas, and shall not be prohibited unless, after notice and hearing
in the vicinity of the affected unit or area, the Secretary finds that such use
would be detrimental to the resource values of the unit or area. Nothing in
this section shall be construed as prohibiting the use of other methods of
transportation for such travel and activities on conservation system lands where
such use is permitted by this Act or other law.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3170(a) (1982).
35. S. REP. No. 413, supra note 28, at 248, which states:
The Committee recommends that traditional uses be allowed to continue...
if uses were generally occurring in the area prior to its designation, those uses
shall be allowed to continue and no proof of pre-existing use will be required ....
The adverse environmental impacts associated with these transportation
modes are not as significant as for roads, pipelines, railroads, etc. both because
no permanent facilities are required and because the transportation vehicles
cannot carry into the country large number of individuals.
36. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.11 (1986). Prior to the uniform rulemaking in 43 C.F.R. § 36.11,
the National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service had adopted similar rules on
an interim basis. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 13.11 to .13 (1982) (NPS); 50 C.F.R. § 36.21 (1982) (FWS).
These interim rules were superseded by the 1986 rulemaking. The preamble material on the
interim rules, and on the re-codification of the uniform Interior rules, provides much useful
information on how Interior construes ANILCA's access guarantees. See 51 Fed. Reg.
31,626-28 (Sept. 4, 1986) (Interior's final uniform rulemaking); 48 Fed. Reg., 32,506 (July
15, 1983) (Interior's proposed uniform rulemaking); 46 Fed. Reg., 31,827 (June 17, 1981) (NPS
and FWS interim rulemaking).
37. Interior eliminated the statutory limitations to access for traditional activities and
for homesite travel, reasoning that: (1) the agency "has the discretion to broaden the authorization beyond that required in the statute;" (2) a general use authorization "would not be in
derogation of the [CSU] values;" and (3) a general use authorization "would provide for greater
enjoyment of these areas by visitors." 51 Fed. Reg. 31,626 (Sept. 4, 1986).
Several environmental groups have challenged Interior's expansion of ANILCA § 1110(a)
access rights in Trustees for Alaska v. Department of the Interior, No. A87-055 (D. Alaska
filed Feb. 9,1987). The suit alleges that 43 C.F.R. § 36.11 violates ANILCA in several ways,
such as by not restricting access to particular areas where the "traditional activities" occurred and not restricting access to traditionally employed modes of access (e.g., dog sled).
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and from villages and homesites" presently remains a potential hurdle
with respect to the use of snowmachines on Interior lands and with respect
to all ANILCA § 1110(a) access methods on Forest Service lands. 8
As implemented, ANILCA § 1110(a) provides access rights in Alaska
national parks and wildlife refuges superior to those available in similar
areas outside Alaska. Airplane and snowmachine access ordinarily are
significantly restricted in national parks and wildlife refuges outside
Alaska. 9
While ANILCA § 1110(a) provides a "floor" of guaranteed access in
CSU's and related areas, two constraints make the section an incomplete
access guarantee. First, ANILCA § 1110(a) does not appear to authorize
the construction or maintenance of improvements, such as landing strips,
docking facilities and roads, which may be required for use of the specified
access methods.41 Second, the limited access methods authorized by
ANILCA § 1110(a) do not include use of off-road vehicles (other than
snowmachines), which often are a preferred means of access in the absence
of improvements. In national parks, wildlife refuges and BLM Wilderness
study areas in Alaska, the regulations allow off-road vehicle use only by
permit to qualified applicants, or following a general opening of an area
to off-road vehicle use.'
B. ANILCA § 1110(b)-Access to Inholdings
Congress provided the major access guarantee for CSU inholders in
ANILCA § 1110(b). This provision obligates the government to permit
"adequate and feasible access" to qualified inholders. ' The scope
of
38. The 1986 Interior rulemaking retains the limitation of ANILCA § 1110(a) that access is allowed only "for traditional activities" or "for travel to and from villages and homesites
and other valid occupancies" only when snowmachines are used. 43 C.F.R. § 36.11(c) (1986).
These limitations on access purposes do not apply when motorboats, nonmotorized surface
transportation or fixed-wing aircraft are used. See id §§ 36.11(d) to -(f) (1986).
39. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.17, 2.18 (1986); 50 C.F.R. §§ 27.31, 27.32, 27.34, 35.5 (1986). For
example, aircraft landings are generally precluded in national parks, see 36 C.F.R. § 2.17
(1986), and wildlife refuges, see 50 C.F.R. § 27.34 (1986), outside Alaska.
40, Legislative history arguably suggests that the ANILCA § 1110(a) access rights
do not include the right to construct permanent improvements. See supra note 35. Most improvements, such as landing strips, appear to qualify as a transportation or utility system
(TUS) under ANILCA § 1102(4), 16 U.S.C. § 3162(4) (1982). Consequently, persons probably
may construct such improvements only by complying with the TUS procedures set out in
id. §§ 3161-3167. See infra text accompanying notes 82-116.
41. Interior could not generally open its Alaska lands to off-road vehicle (ORV) use due
to the ORV restrictions contained in Executive Order 11644. See 51 Fed. Reg. 31,626 (Sept.
4, 1986); infma note 126. The regulations allow ORV use only: (1) on established roads or parking
areas; (2) in additional areas designated in accordance with the procedures of E.O. 11633;
and (3) in additional areas by a permit issued under 43 C.F.R. §§ 36.10 or 36.12, or by a permit issued upon a finding that ORV use would be compatible with the purposes of the CSU.
43 C.F.R. § 36.11(g) (1986).
42. ANILCA § 1110(b) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act or other law, in any case
in which State owned or privately owned land, including subsurface rights of
such owners underlying public lands, or a valid mining claim or other valid
occupancy is within or its effectively surrounded by one or more conservation
system units, national recreation areas, national conservation areas, or those
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ANILCA section 1110(b) can be analyzed by answering two questions:
(1) Who is a qualified inholder? (2) What is the level of the access entitlement?
To qualify for access under ANILCA § 1110(b), a person must be an
"owner or occupier" holding: (1) title to non-federal land interest, including
surface or subsurface rights; (2) a valid mining claim, whether patented
or unpatented, under the 1872 Mining Law;43 or (3) a "valid occupancy"4
interest, such as a lease or permit from a federal or non-federal landowner. '
The land interest must be either a true "inholding" completely surrounded by a CSU or private land "effectively surrounded" by a CSU and "physical barriers" to fall within the scope of § 1110(b). 41 ANILCA § 1110(b)
is silent as to whether the provision guarantees access only from the boundary of the CSU to the inholding, or whether it also creates a right to
adjacent Forest Service and BLM lands to reach a CSU inaccess across
s
holding.4'
Interior's 1986 rulemaking interpreted the level of access entitlement,
stating that the ANILCA § 1110(b) guarantee of "adequate and feasible
access" means:
a route and method of access that is shown to be reasonably necessary and economically practicable but not necessarily the least
costly alternative for achieving the use and development by the
applicant on the applicant's non-federal land or occupancy interest.'7
This regulatory definition presents two interesting issues.
First, as clarified in the preamble to the rulemaking, Interior has defined the nebulous ANILCA § 1110(b) concept of "access" in terms of any
right-of-way necessary to permit development of the inholding, including
public lands designated as [w]ilderness study, the State or private owner or
occupier shall be given by the Secretary such rights as may be necessary to
assure adequate and feasible access for economic and other purposes to the
concerned land by such State or private owner or occupier and their successors
in interest. Such rights shall be subject to reasonable regulations issued by
the Secretary to protect the natural and other values of such lands.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3170(b) (1982). In contrast, CSU inholders outside of Alaska do not have
this absolute assurance of access. See supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.
43. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1982).
44. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(a)(4) (1986). The rulemaking preamble makes it clear that a
'valid leasehold" or "valid occupancy" (e.g., an oil and gas lease, grazing lease, or special
use permit) is sufficient to create ANILCA § 1110(b) access rights. 51 Fed. Reg. 31,625 (Sept.
4, 1986).
45. 43 C.F.R. §§ 36.10)a)(3), -(4) (1986).
46. In id. § 36.1(a) (1986), Interior arguably takes the position that § 1110(b) applies
only "within any conservation system unit." This issue could become significant. If ANILCA
§ 1110(b) guarantees to inholders access only from the CSU boundary, there might not be
assurance of access across adjacent BLM and Forest Service lands. For example, ANILCA
§ 1323 might not assure CSU inholders access across such adjacent lands because it applies
to BLM and national forest inholders; a CSU inholder might not qualify. This could frustrate
the legislative intent that ANILCA § 1110(b) assure access and could require that the provision be read to encompass access rights across adjacent lands in appropriate cases.
47. 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(a)(1) (1986).
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rights-of-way for roads, pipelines and transmission lines."R This interpretation represents a significant change from that of Interior's now rescinded, interim 1980 rulemaking which had defined access solely in terms
of
"pedestrian or vehicular transportation" (e.g., access
refers to movement
of people and machinery), thus excluding a guarantee for pipelines and
transmission lines.41 Under Interior's current view, ANILCA § 1110(b)
becomes an all-encompassing guarantee that an inholder will be granted
all rights-of-way necessary for development.
Second, the regulatory definition seems to make the inholder virtually the sole arbiter of the desired type and level of development of his nonfederal land interest. The adequate and feasible access definition obligates
the federal government to permit "economically practicable" access commensurate with the "development [intended] by the applicant." This result
appears to flow from ANILCA § 103(c),10 which arguably prohibits direct
federal regulation of inholdings, and from ANILCA § 1110(b), which
appears to prohibit indirect regulation of inholding development through
access controls. These two sections leave Interior with no discretion
to
deny access to a qualified inholder, or to tailor access so as to interfere
with the intended use or development of the inholding. This means that
Interior's regulations likely ensure inholder access for anything from
small wilderness cabin to a large scale mineral, timber or housing develop-a
ment. The implementing Interior regulations strive to provide to the inholder his desired route and method of access. However, if the appropriate
agency makes certain findings, it may substitute another form or route
of adequate and feasible access in exceptional circumstances."'
48. The rulemaking preamble states Interior's intent to apply ANILCA
§ 1110(b) to
requests for "pipelines or transmission lines," since "the statute clearly
cess right is for 'economic and other purposes'; not merely for ingress states that the acReg. 31,624 (Sept. 4,1986). Several environmental groups have alleged and egress." 51 Fed.
that 43 C.F.R. § 36.10
is unlawful because it is not limited to pedestrian and vehicular access
in the Trustees for
Alaska litigation. See supra note 37. This suit also alleges that other aspects
of the § 36.10
rule are unlawful under ANILCA.
49. The prior and now rescinded definition of access as solely "pedestrian
or vehicular
transportation," appears at 36 C.F.R. § 13.1(a) (1982) (NPS) and 50 C.F.R.
§ 36.2(a) (1982)
(FWS). In this superseded interim rulemaking, see supra note 36, the
NPS and FWS had
stated that non-vehicular rights-of-way for pipelines and transmission
lines were not within
the scope of the ANILCA § 1110(b) "access" guarantee: "If the permanent
improvement
is not required as part of the applicant's right to adequate and feasible access
(e.g., pipeline, transmission line) the permit granting standards of sectionsto an inholding
1104-1107 of
ANILCA shall apply." 36 C.F.R. § 13.15(c)(2)(ii) (1986); 50 C.F.R. §
36.23c)(2)(ii) (1986).
50. ANILCA § 103(c) provides:
Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit
which
are public lands [federally owned lands]... shall be deemed to be included
as
a portion of such unit. No lands which, before, on, or after [the date of
enactment of this Act,] are conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation,
to any private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely or
to
public lands within such units.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (1982).
51. The Interior regulations provide that the federal agency shall:
(e)(1)... permit the route(s) and methods(s) across the area(s) desired
by the
applicant, unless it is determined that:
i) the route or method of access would cause significant adverse impacts
on natural or other values of the [federal land] area and adequate and feasible
access otherwise exists; or

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXII

The 1986 Interior regulations also clarify the relationship between the
guarantee of inholder access in ANILCA § 1110(b) and the procedures for
obtaining federal approval of a transportation or utility system ("TUS")
in ANILCA §§ 1101-1107. Congress did not clarify whether § 1110(b) or
§§ 1101-1107 should govern when the access route desired by a qualified
§ 1110(b) applicant also constitutes a TUS under § 1102(4). Under the
regulations, an applicant for access under § 1110(b) must comply with the
procedures of § 1104 by filing a consolidated application to request access and submitting to expedited National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) compliance procedures and agency decisions to evaluate the access proposal. 2 However, these regulations do accord better treatment
to the qualified ANILCA § 1110(b) applicant than to the ordinary appli3
cant for a TUS, who has no assurance that Interior will grant access.
the
obligaThe rules relieve the qualified ANILCA § 1110(b) applicant from
tion to comply with the remaining procedures in §§ 1101-1107 and ensure
that such applicant will receive a permit for "adequate and feasible ac4
cess" from the federal agency at the end of the administrative process.
faithfully
to
implement
appear
regulations
Thus, as discussed below, the
the guarantee of access in § 1110(b) and to interpret reasonably the dis5
parate commands of §§ 1101-1107 and § 1110(b) in a harmonious manner.
C. ANILCA § 1111-Temporary Access
While ANILCA § 1110(b) accords CSU inholders guaranteed access,
ANILCA § 1111 provides a "private landowner" with temporary access
across CSU's and other listed areas for "survey, geophysical, exploratory
or other temporary uses" of non-federal lands.5 6 Unlike the ANILCA
(ii) The route or method of access would jeopardize public health and safety
and adequate and feasible access otherwise exists; or
(iii) The route or method is inconsistent with the management plan(s) for
the [federal] area or purposes for which the area was established and adequate
and feasible access otherwise exists; or
(iv) The method is unnecessary to accomplish the applicant's land use
objective.
(2) If the appropriate Federal agency makes one of the findings described in
paragraph (e)(1) of this section, another alternative route(s) and/or method(s)
of access that will provide the applicant adequate and feasible access shall be
specified by Ithe appropriate] Federal agency ....
43 C.F.R. § 36.10(e)(1) to -(2) (1986). Thus, these regulations seem to assert the authority
to change not only the route, but also the method (e.g., off-road vehicle to airplane access),
of desired access to protect federal resource values, so long as the access remains economically
practicable and adequate.
52. See id. §§ 36.10(c), -(d).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 100-109.
54. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(e)(1) (1986).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 111-116.
56. ANILCA § 1111 provides:
(a) In General
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or other law the Secretary
shall authorize and permit temporary access by the State or a private landowner
to or across any conservation system unit, national recreation area, national
conservation area, the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska or those public
lands designated as Iwlilderness study or managed to maintain the [wlilderness
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§ 1110(b) absolute assurance of access, the regulations implementing
ANILCA § 1111 allow temporary access only where it does not require
"permanent facilities" and "will not result in permanent harm to the resources of" the federal lands.17 And while "owners and occupiers," such
as lessees, have ANILCA § 1110(b) access rights, § 1111 does not expressly
authorize access for lessees and permittees.
Thus, the conclusion of the implementing Interior regulations that
ANILCA § 11 10(b) provides access rights superior to those provided by
ANILCA § 1111 when both sections apply is well-founded." This relationship may render ANILCA § 1111 a relatively unimportant access provision, for the most part useful only when the applicant is not a CSU inholder and seeks access completely across a CSU; a situation not covered
by ANILCA § 1110(b).

III.

GUARANTEED ACCESS TO INHOLDINGS WITHIN THE NATIONAL
FOREST SYSTEM AND BLM-MANAGED PUBLIC LANDS

In substantially identical language, subsections (a) and (b) of ANILCA
§ 1323 assure adequate access to inholdings located within the National
Forest System and BLM-managed public lands, respectively. 9 Neither
character or potential thereof, in order to permit the State or private landowner
access to its land for purposes of survey, geophysical, exploratory, or other
temporary uses thereof whenever he determines such access will not result in
permanent harm to the resources of such unit, area, Reserve or lands.
(b) Stipulations and conditions
In providing temporary access pursuant to subsection (a) of this section,
the Secretary may include such stipulations and conditions he deems necessary
to insure that the private use of public lands is accomplished in a manner that
is not inconsistent with the purposes for which the public lands are reserved
and which insures that no permanent harm will result to the resources of the
unit, area, Reserve or lands.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3171 (1982).
57. 43 C.F.R. § 36.12(d) (1986). Certain aspects of the § 36.12 rule implementing ANILCA
§ 1111 have been challenged in the Trustees for Alaska litigation, supra note 37.
58. 43 C.F.R. § 36.12(b) (1986 provides that "[s]tate and private landowners meeting
the criteria of § 36.10(b) [the regulation implementing ANILCA § 1110(b)] are directed to
utilize the procedures of § 36.10 to obtain temporary access."
59. ANILCA § 1323 provides:
(a) Reasonable use and enjoyment of land within boundaries of National Forest
System
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to such terms
and conditions as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe, the Secretary
shall provide such access to nonfederally owned land within the boundaries
of the National Forest System as the Secretary deems adequate to secure to
the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof: Provided,that such owner
comply with rules and regulations applicable to ingress and egress to or from
the National Forest System.
(b) Reasonable use and enjoyment of land surrounded by public lands managed by Secretary
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to such terms
and conditions as the Secretary of [the] Interior may prescribe, the Secretary
shall provide such access to nonfederally owned land surrounded by public lands
managed by the Secretary under the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1701-82) as the Secretary deems adequate to secure to
the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof: Provided, that such owner
comply with rules and regulations applicable to access across public lands.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3210 (1982).
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the Forest Service nor the BLM has promulgated regulations implementing ANILCA § 1323.
A. The Level of Assured Access Under ANILCA § 1323
ANILCA § 1323 obligates the relevant agency to provide by permit
access that is "adequate to secure... reasonable use" to an "owner" whose
property is surrounded by Forest Service or BLM land. The level of access that is "adequate" would appear to vary with the level of "reasonable"
development. The relevant agency likely can prescribe less environmentally deleterious access routes and methods, so long as economically practicable access is provided. Like the access rights afforded by ANILCA
§ 1110(b), the access rights provided by § 1323 also presumably include
the right to construct permanent access improvements on federal lands,
such as roads, landing strips, and bridges, in appropriate cases.
Unlike ANILCA § 1110(b), however, ANILCA § 1323 is more ambiguous as to whether the inholder can dictate the extent of his desired
development. Since ANILCA § 1323 guarantees only "reasonable use and
enjoyment" of an inholding, the relevant federal land manager arguably
retains the discretion to declare a proposed development activity "unreasonable" due to its inconsistency with surrounding federal land use and
thereby to refuse to grant access sufficient for the proposed development.
It remains to be seen whether the Forest Service or BLM will assert this
authority.
Additionally, ANILCA § 1323 employs the same inexact term "access" found in § 1110(b). Interior has interpreted "access" under ANILCA
§ 1110(b) comprehensively to include all rights-of-way needed for development, such as rights-of-way for pipelines, transmission lines, and the like.
It is unclear, however, whether Interior and the Forest Service will construe § 1323 similarly. 60 Arguably, the Forest Service could attempt to
interpret ANILCA § 1323(a) differently to include only personal transportation rights since the provision, unlike ANILCA § 1110(b) and section
1323(b), refers to the landowner's access for "ingress and egress."
B. The Geographic Scope of ANILCA § 1323
The geographic scope of ANILCA § 1323 has received more attention
than the nature of its access rights. In Montana Wilderness Association
v. U.S. Forest Service,6 ' the Ninth Circuit held that ANILCA § 1323(a)
assures access to inholdings within the National Forest System nationwide. The Interior Board of Land Appeals has similarly held that § 1323(b)
applies to BLM lands nationwide. These cases are discussed below.
The Montana Wilderness Association litigation arose in 1979, as a
challenge by environmental groups to the Forest Service's grant of a per60. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
61. 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). The case is discussed
in Comment, Wilderness Values and Access Rights: Troubling Statutory ConstructionBrings
the Alaska Lands Act Into Play, 54 U. CoLo. L. REV. 593 (1983).
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mit authorizing Burlington Northern Inc. to construct a logging road giving it access to its own timberlands. The access was to be across federal
lands in a "checkerboard" area of alternate federal and private lands in
the Gallatin National Forest in Montana. The road would have defeated
the wilderness study protection afforded to the federal lands by the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977.62 After the plaintiffs had received a
temporary restraining order barring action under the permit, the Forest
Service suspended the permit and submitted the question of Burlington
Northern's access rights to the Attorney General. This resulted in the
Civiletti Opinion, discussed above, which rejected the Forest Service's
arguments that the common law doctrine of easements by necessity applies to federal lands, and found that Burlington Northern had no express
statutory access rights.63 The Forest Service then reinstated the access
permit on the grounds that an access right should be implied under the
1984 land grant, in accordance with the implied statutory access rights
theory of the Attorney General.
After the Forest Service reinstated the access permit under its new
theory of an implied statutory right to access, the case proceeded in
district court. In 1980, the district court held that Burlington Northern
was entitled to access across the Gallatin National Forest under either
an easement by necessity theory or an implied statutory access theory. 64
The parties then cross-appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In the Ninth Circuit's first opinion of May 14, 1981, the court rejected the government's
argument that § 1323(a) of the recently enacted Alaska Lands Act applies to states other than Alaska and thus guarantees access to Burlington
Northern."5 This initial Ninth Circuit opinion also reversed the district
court's holding that Burlington Northern had implied statutory and easement by necessity
access rights, leaving Burlington Northern without its
66
desired access.

62. Pub. L. No. 95-150, 91 Stat. 1243 (1977. Wilderness areas are, by definition, roadless.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c), 1133(c) (1982).
63. Attorney General Civiletti construed the statutory provision under which the permit had been granted (16 U.S.C. § 478) literally to grant access rights across National Forest
System lands only to "actual settlers." See Civiletti Opinion, supra note 23, at 1-13.
64. 496 F. Supp. 880, 880-81 (D. Mont. 1980), a/f'd in part & rev'd in part, 655 F.2d
951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
65. While the May 14, 1981, opinion is not found in the official reporters, it was briefly
reported at 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,521 (9th Cir. 1981). The court withdrew
its May opinion upon issuing a new opinion on Aug. 19, 1981. The Environmental Law
Reporter replaced the earlier pages with new ones, discarding the May opinion. A copy of
the May opinion as published in the ELR is on file at the Land & Water Law Review office.
In its May opinion, the court stated: "We hold that § 1323 of the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act is limited to the State of Alaska, and so has no relevance to this
case." Id. at 20,524 (May opinion).
66. On the implied statutory access rights theory, the Ninth Circuit opined that private
access rights in the railroad land grant checkerboard was the "flip side of Leo Sheep" and,
since the government has no implied access rights over private lands, "no reciprocal rights"
should be granted to private parties. Id. at 20,524, 20,525 (May opinion). The court viewed
the easement by necessity doctrine as allowing only access that "is consistent with the intent of the sovereign" and, since it had previously concluded that Congress had intended
no implied access in enacting the railroad land grant statute, the court held that "Burlington
Northern does not have an easement by necessity across federal land to its inholding." Id.
at 20,525, 20,526 (May opinion).
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The government then moved for reconsideration. On August 19, 1981,
the Ninth Circuit reversed itself and vacated its earlier opinion. The court
held that, despite the provision's incongruous placement in the Alaska
Lands Act, ANILCA § 1323(a) provides a statutory guarantee of access
applicable to the National Forest System "nation-wide." 6I Thus, at least
with respect to the States encompassed by the Ninth Circuit, ANILCA
§ 1323(a) provides a minimum assurance of access that applies to the National Forest System outside Alaska. Although the question of the nationwide scope of ANILCA § 1323 is clouded by conflicting legislative
history, the Ninth Circuit's resolution seems correct, particularly given
the Forest Service's endorsement of that position."
Montana Wilderness Association left two issues unresolved. First, the
second Ninth Circuit opinion expressly left open the issue of whether
ANILCA § 1323(a), which purports to require access within the "National
Forest System... [nJotwithstanding any other provision of law," governs
access over national forest lands that have been designated as part of the
National Wilderness Preservation System. 9 Sections 4(c) and 5(a) of the
Wilderness Act contain access restrictions which arguably are as controlling as ANILCA § 1323(a) purports to be.7" Although the issue of the
supremacy of either ANILCA § 1323(a) or the Wilderness Act is a difficult one, it nonetheless appears that the later enacted ANILCA
67. Montana WildernessAss'n, 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
989 (1982).
68. The confusing, contradictory and sometimes after-the-fact legislative history of
ANILCA § 1323(a) is developed at length in id. at 955-57. All that can be said with certainty
is that Senator John Melcher of Montana, the sponsor of ANILCA § 1323, and certain other
congressmen intimately involved in the development of ANILCA thought that ANILCA
§ 1323 applied nationwide, while others (notably Representative Morris Udall, Chairman
of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, which reported ANILCA, until he
changed his mind in voting for the conference report quoted infra note 71) thought that it
did not. The Forest Service's interpretation that ANILCA § 1323(a) applies nationwide
arguably should govern given that courts accord great deference to the contemporaneous
interpretation of an ambiguous statute urged by the implementing agency. See, e.g., Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
69. "We recognize a facial problem or tension between 1323(a) and a portion of... [the
Wilderness Act]. We need not decide in this case whether there is repeal by implication."
Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 655 F.2d at 957 n.12.
70. Section 4(c) of the Wilderness Act provides:
Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and subject to existing
private rights, there shall be... no permanent road within any [W]ilderness
area designated by this chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum
requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter
... there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical
transport, and no structure or installation within any such area.
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982). Section 5(a) of the Wilderness Act provides:
In any case where State-owned or privately owned land is completely surrounded by national forest lands within areas designated by this chapter as
[W]ilderness, such State or private owner shall be given such rights as may
be necessary to assure adequate access.., or the State-owned land or privately owned land shall be exchanged for federally owned land ....
16 U.S.C. § 1134(a) (1982). The Attorney General construed § 5(a) not to contain an absolute
assurance of access; rather, the "landowner has a right to access or exchange." Civiletti Opinion, supra note 23, at 26 (emphasis in original).
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§ 1323(a)-which provides that it applies "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law"- would be found to govern and thus to guarantee inholder access in national forest Wilderness areas. This result comports
with the legislative history that the court in Montana Wilderness Association found to favor the nationwide applicability of ANILCA § 1323(a). The
court relied on a conference committee decision on a post-ANILCA
Wilderness bill that deleted an access provision for the bill on the ground
that ANILCA § 1323(a) already provided such access in Wilderness areas
outside Alaska." Consequently, ANILCA § 1323(a) appears to apply in
Wilderness areas of national forests nationwide.
Second, the court in Montana Wilderness Association left in doubt
the applicability of ANILCA § 13231b) to BLM lands outside Alaska, since
7
1
the court merely assumed arguendo that § 1323(b) applies only in Alaska.
ANILCA
that
held
since
has
(IBLA)
Appeals
Land
of
The Interior Board
73
§ 1323(b) similarly assures inholder access across BLM lands nationwide.
In Utah Wilderness Association, the IBLA considered the access rights
of Shell Oil Company across a BLM-managed Wilderness study area in
Utah to a Shell oil lease on State lands. The majority reasoned that, since
the ANILCA § 1323 "legislative history clearly supports the conclusion
that these two subsections have the same [geographical] scope" and since
Montana Wilderness Association had held that § 1323(a applies nation7
wide, § 1323(b) likewise applies to BLM lands nationwide. The IBLA
in Alaska
only
rejected the statutory argument that § 1323(b) is applicable
because it provides access across "public lands" and ANILCA § 102(3)
7
defines "public lands" as certain federal "land situated in Alaska."
71. The legislative history that the Ninth Circuit found "decisive" in Montana
Wilderness Ass'n, 655 F. 2d at 957, for the proposition that ANILCA § 1323(a) applies nationwide also appears equally decisive for the proposition that ANILCA § 1323(a) guarantees
access into National Forest System Wilderness areas. In considering the designation of
Wilderness in National Forests in Colorado, the House-Senate Conference Committee stated
that special access protections were not required because ANILCA § 1323(a) already
guaranteed access in national forest Wilderness areas:
Section 7 of the Senate amendment contains a provision pertaining to access to non-federally owned lands within national forest [W]ilderness areas in
Colorado. The House bill has no such provision.
The conferees agreed to delete the section because similar language has
already passed Congress in section 1323 of the Alaska National Interest lands
Conservation Act.
H. R. REP. No. 1521, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980). At least one commentator has expressed
the view that ANILCA § 1323(a) does not guarantee access in national forest Wilderness
areas. See Comment, supra note 61, at 612-14. The authors believe that the Comment's "repeal
by implication" argument is incorrect, since ANILCA § 1323(a) repeals prior laws expressly
(that is, it applies "[niotwithstanding any other provision of law") and not by implication.
See In re Oswego Barge Co., 664 F.2d 327, 340 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1980.
72. Montana Wilderness Association, 655 F.2d at 954. The court stated, "Subsection
(b), therefore, is arguably limited by its terms to Alaska, though we do not find it necessary
to settle that issue here. Our consideration of the scope of § 1323(b) proceeds under the assumption that § 1323(b) is limited to Alaska."
73. Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 Interior Dec. 165, 172-73 (1984) (also reported at 80 Interior Bd. Land App. 64, 76-77 (Mar. 30, 1984) IBLA No. 83-356)).
74. ld at 172.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 3102(3) (1982).
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Instead, the IBLA reasoned that "the subsection itself defines the term
'public lands' as land 'managed by the Secretary under the
Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976' " and that this latter definition
should control to accord with the legislative intent.16
A concurring opinion in Utah Wilderness Association would have
granted Shell's desired access on the separate ground that the decision
in Utah v. Andrus requires access to state school trust lands." The concurring opinion questioned whether the IBLA could ignore the "public
lands" definition of ANILCA § 102(3) and hesitated to have the IBLA
construe expansively ANILCA § 1323(b) without judicial guidance, "particularly where such an interpretation requires that we ignore the plain
meaning of the language used. ' '7
While Utah Wilderness Association was appealed, no judicial opinion
regarding the nationwide application of ANILCA § 1323(b) was issued. 9
The case was dismissed as moot after Shell relinquished the right-of-way.
The BLM has taken the position in its Manual that ANILCA § 1323(b)
applies on BLM lands nationwide, and requires "that the access necessary
for the reasonable use and enjoyment of the non-Federal land cannot be
denied."'
A recent Supreme Court decision casts some doubt on the Montana
Wilderness Association and Utah Wilderness Association conclusions that
ANILCA § 1323 guarantees inholder access across the National Forest
System and BLM lands nationwide.6 '
76. 91 Interior Dec. at 169, 171-73.
77. 486 F. Supp. 995 (C.D. Utah 1979).
78. Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 91 Interior Dec. at 176-77.
79. Utah Wilderness Ass'n v. Clark, No. C-84-0742J (C.D. Utah complaint filed May
25, 1984).
80. BLM MANUAL Part 2800.06 D (1985).
81. In Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987), the Court
held that the protection of subsistence afforded by ANILCA § 810 (16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1982))
did not apply outside the State of Alaska, for instance on the federal Outer Continental Shelf
outside state boundaries. In so ruling, the Court stated in dictum that the "other provisions
of ANILCA... need not be extended beyond the State of Alaska in order to effectuate their
apparent purposes." 107 S.Ct. at 1407. This statement arguably implies that ANILCA §
1323 does not apply outside Alaska. Despite this, since the Court did not expressly address
ANILCA § 1323, its legislative history, or the Montana Wilderness Association and Utah
Wilderness Association decisions, arguably the Village of Gainbell decision does not restrict
ANILCA § 1323 to Alaska.
The Court also noted that ANILCA § 102(3) (16 U.S.C. § 3102(3) (1982))
"public lands" as "Land situated in Alaska", and stated in dictum that this definition of
definition "applies as well to the rest of the statute". 107 S.Ct. at 1405-07. This statement appears to
undercut the IBLA's reasoning in Utah Wilderness Association, 92 Interior Dec. 165, 171-73
(1984). The IBLA reasoned that ANILCA § 102(3) definition of "public Lands" did not apply to ANILCA § 1323(b) because § 13231b) had its own definition of Public lands which
was not limited to Alaska. If ANILCA § 102(3)'s definition is controlling as the Supreme
Court suggested, ANILCA § 1323(b) is limited to BLM lands in Alaska.
Thus, dicta in the Village of Gambell case calls into question the nationwide applicability
of ANILCA § 1323 in general, and § 1323(b) in particular. The uncertain geographical scope
of these ANILCA access guarantees provides a further reason for legislative clarification
of access rights across federal lands, as advocated in Section VI, infra.
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IV.

TRANSPORTATION OR UTILITY SYSTEMS UNDER

ANILCA

The provision of specific access guarantees in ANILCA was motivated
in part by the absence of mature transportation and utility infrastructures in Alaska. Congress also recognized that existing law was cumbersome and inadequate for consideration of transportation or utility
systems.8 2 Consequently, in ANILCA §§ 1101-1107,81 Congress provided
new authorities and procedures for federal consideration of transportation and utility system proposals in Alaska. The intent of Congress was
to establish a mandatory, uniform and expedited process for the federal
consideration of a "transportation or utility system" (TUS). An overview
of ANILCA §§ 1101-1107 is provided in the next paragraph, followed by
a more detailed discussion of the provisions as implemented in Interior
regulations."4
ANILCA § 1102 broadly defines the key term "transportation or utilito include such facilities as pipelines, transmission lines, roads,
system"
ty
and airports-if any portion of the system would cross a CSU or similar
conservation area in Alaska. Whenever a qualifying TUS is proposed,
ANILCA § 1104 requires that the proponent file a consolidated application form containing all the information required for TUS approval by
all federal agencies. The provision also contains schedules for expedited
agency decision-making and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). Substantive agency decision-making standards for a TUS remain largely intact. Agency decisions may be appealed
under ANILCA § 1106 if: (1) an agency disapproves a given TUS in its
discretion; or (2) an agency lacked authority to approve a given TUS; or
(3) the TUS would cross a Wilderness area. In the first situation, ANILCA
§ 1106(a) allows the applicant to appeal to the President, who has authority
to approve the TUS. In the latter two situations, the TUS may be approved under ANILCA § 1106(b) if the President recommends approval
and the Congress adopts a joint resolution of approval.
82. The ANILCA legislative history contained recognition that Alaska's "existing
transportation and utility systems are in their embryonic stage of development." H.R. REP.
No. 97, Pt. I, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1979(. Congress felt that existing law was inadequate to ensure the approval of future transportation and utility systems needed for Alaska's
development:
[Eixisting law makes siting of roads and airports, particularly, but other modes
as well, very difficult if not impossible in [Wlilderness areas, parks, wild and
scenic rivers, and wildlife refuges (in descending order of difficulty). Specifically,
in the case of parks and [W]ilderness, no statutory law presently permits the
issuance of rights-of-way for general access. Secondly, existing law makes for
bad decisions from a land planning and environmental standpoint because it
is incremental in nature.
Id at 237. One of the gaps in existing law was that "there is no applicable law providing
for oil and gas pipelines across National Parks." S. REP No. 413, supra note 28, at 298. To
remedy such inadequacies, Congress "adopted a [consolidated] procedure for future siting
of transportation facilities which supersedes rather than supplements existing law." Id at 246.
83. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3162-3167 (1982). Due to the length of these sections, only the most
significant provisions will be quoted in the text and footnotes which follow.
84. The operation of the TUS procedures also is discussed in Sagalkin & Panitch, Mineral
Development Under the Alaska Lands Act, 10 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 117, 133-41 (1981).
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Interior has implemented the TUS provisions in two actions: the 1981
publication of the consolidated application form"5 and the 1986 promulgation of regulations governing Interior's consideration of TUS proposals.6
The operation of the TUS provisions as implemented is discussed in detail
below.
ANILCA § 1102(4) and the regulations define the critical term
"transportation or utility system" by type and location. 7 The term covers
seven categories of systems and is applicable if any portion of the system
would be routed across a CSU or other listed federal areas. Under this
definition, a system built wholly on non-federal lands or on certain Forest
Service and BLM lands would not be subject to the TUS procedures. The
broad categories of qualified systems appear to encompass nearly every
form of transportation, utility, and energy distribution methods, particularly because of the catch-all phrase that "other systems of general
transportation""" are included. The congressional choice of the word "systems" to describe these rights-of-way- implying that ANILCA Title XI
applies only to large-scale transportation and utility networks-appears
misleading, since a relatively small-scale facility, such as a road or landing strip, also may constitute a TUS.
85. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,757-58 (June 3, 1981). The form (Standard Form 299) was revised
and re-issued in 1983.
86. 43 C.F.R. §§ 36.1 to .9 (1986). Certain aspects of the TUS rules have been challenged
in the Trustees for Alaska litigation, supra note 37.
87. ANILCA § 1102 provides:
(A) The term "transportation or utility system" means any type of system
described in subparagraph (B) if any portion of the route of the system will
be within any conservation system unit, national recreation area, or national
conservation area in the State (and the system is not one that the department
or agency having jurisdiction over the unit or area is establishing incident to
its management of the unit or area).
(B) The types of systems to which subparagraph (A) applies are as follows:
(i)Canals, ditches, flumes, laterals, pipes, pipelines, tunnels, and other
systems for the transportation of water.
(ii) Pipelines and other systems for the transportation of liquids other than
water, including oil, natural gas, synthetic liquid and gaseous fuels, and any
refined product produced therefrom.
(iii) Pipelines, slurry and emulsion systems and conveyor belts for the
transportation of solid materials.
(iv) Systems for the transmission and distribution of electric energy.
v) Systems for transmission or reception of radio, television, telephone,
telegraph, and other electronic signals, and other means of communication.
(vi) Improved rights-of-way for snow machines, air cushion vehicles, and
other all-terrain vehicles.
(vii) Roads, highways, railroads, tunnels, tramways, airports, landing
strips, docks, and other systems of general transportation.
Any system described in this subparagraph includes such related structures
and facilities (both temporary and permanent) along the route of the system
as may be minimally necessary for the construction, operation, and maintenance
of this system. Such related structures and facilities shall be described in the
application required by section 1104, and shall be approved or disapproved
in accordance with the procedures set forth in this title.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3162(4) (1982); 43 C.F.R. § 36.2(p) (1986).
88. ANILCA § 1102(4); see 16 U.S.C. § 3162(4) (1982). The legislative history suggests
that systems of general transportation include "private and commercial transportation of
passengers and shipment of goods." S. REP. No. 413, supra note 28, at 244.
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Related structures and facilities along the route of the system that
are necessary for its construction and maintenance (e.g., construction
roads) also are included in the TUS. While the proposed rulemaking specifically excluded certain production and storage facilities from the definition of "related structures and facilities," these exceptions were deleted
in the final rulemaking. Instead, the preamble states that the "test will
be whether the related facility is reasonably necessary to the operation
of the TUS." 9 Further, the rule defines "related structures and facilities"
as those which are listed by the applicant on the consolidated application
form."
Persons proposing a system or facility must accurately determine
whether it constitutes a TUS under ANILCA Title XI and then identify
all components of the TUS. ANILCA § 1104(a) ominously provides that
no federal authorization for a TUS "shall have any force or effect" unless
the entire TUS complies with § 1104.91 For example, if a person mistakenly obtains approval for a right-of-way under legal authority other than
ANILCA §§ 1101-1107 and an opposing group or the government later
discovers that the right-of-way comes within the definition of a TUS, litigation may ensue to invalidate the earlier approval. The desirability of such
a potentially punitive provision in a statutory scheme enacted for the
benefit of TUS proponents is questionable. Interior, however, has attempted to forestall the potentially adverse consequences of this provision by
urging TUS proponents to engage in preapplication meetings with federal
officials to seek agreement on the extent and components of the proposed
TUS.92
The unique Title XI procedures begin when an applicant proposes a
qualifying TUS. Instead of completing a number of different agency forms
and being subjected to a maze of federal processing schedules, the TUS
applicant need submit only a single consolidated application form that
the relevant agencies will consider under expedited procedures established
by ANILCA § 1104.91 ANILCA § 1104(e) contemplates that NEPA's
89. 51 Fed. Reg. 31,622, 31,630 (Sept. 4, 1986).
90. 43 C.F.R. § 36.2(m) (1986). This subsection states:" 'Related structures and facilities'
means those structures, facilities and right-of-ways [sic] which are reasonably and minimally necessary for the construction, operation and maintenance of a TUS, and which are listed
as part of the TUS on the consolidated application form ...
91. ANILCA § 1104(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of applicable law, no action by any Federal
agency under applicable law with respect to the approval or disapproval of the
authorization, in whole or in part, of any transportation or utility system shall
have any force or effect unless the provisions of this section are complied with.

See 16 U.S.C. § 3164(a) (1982).

92. See 46 Fed. Reg. 29,759-60 (June 3, 1981); 43 C.F.R. § 36.3 (1986).
93. In pertinent part, ANILCA § 1104 provides:
(b) Consolidated applications
(1) Within one hundred and eighty days after the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall
jointly prescribe and publish a consolidated application form to be used for
applying for the approval of each type of transportation or utility system. Each
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environmental impact statement (EIS) responsibilities related to the TUS
"shall be completed within one year from the date" of
filing a consolidated
application form." The application and TUS approval procedures apply
not only to the affected federal land managing agencies, but also to every
federal agency having jurisdiction over the construction or operation of
the TUS. 5 For example, if a telecommunications facility on CSU lands
requires the approval of the Federal Communications Commission, the
TUS procedures likely apply to both Interior's approval of the site and
any Commission approval for operation of the facility. Thus, the TUS procedures appear to provide "one-stop shopping" for all federal authorizations necessary to establish a TUS.
Four factors may lengthen the NEPA compliance period or may
diminish the cost savings suggested by the "one-stop shopping" approach.
First, ANILCA Title XI generally did not supersede existing agency informational requirements; consequently, the consolidated application form
may not reduce appreciably the TUS proponent's reporting burden.96 Second, Title XI does not decrease meaningfully a TUS proponent's information cost, since the regulations require that the TUS proponent pay
the "costs to the United States of application processing" and the
such application form shall be designed to elicit such information as may be
necessary to meet the requirements of this title and the applicable law with
respect to the type of system concerned.
12) For purposes of this section, the heads of all appropriate Federal agencies, including the Secretary of Transportation, shall share decisionmaking
responsibility in the case of any transportation or utility system described in
section 1102(4)B)(ii), (iii), or (vii); but with respect to any such system for which
he does not have programmatic responsibility, the Secretary of Transportation shall provide to the other Federal agencies concerned such planning and
other assistance as may be appropriate.
(c) Filing
Each applicant for the approval of any transportation or utility system
shall file on the same day an application with each appropriate Federal agency. The applicant shall utilize the consolidated form prescribed under subsection (b) for the type of transportation or utility system concerned.
See 16 U.S.C. §3164(b), -(c) (1982). One may question whether the publication of one general
consolidated application form by the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture and Transportation comports with the intent of Congress, since ANILCA § 1104 appears to envision different and specific application forms for each of the seven categories of Systems. See ANILCA
99 1104(b))1) (The Secretaries "shall ... publish a consolidated application form ... for the
approval of each type of transportation or utility system. Each such application form shall
be designed to elicit such information ... with respect to the type of system concerned.");
-(c) ("The applicant shall utilize the consolidated [application] form.. . for the type of transportation or utility system concerned."); 16 U.S.C. §§ 3164(b)(1), -(c) (1982).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 3164(e) (1982).
95. See ANILCA §§ 1102(1), 1104(c); 16 U.S.C. §§ 3162(1), 3164(c) (1982); 43 C.F.R. §§
36.2(d), 36.4(a) (1986).
96. Congress seems to have contemplated the retention of existing agency information
requirements by providing in ANILCA § 1103 that, "[eixcept as specifically provided in this
title, applicable law shall apply with respect to the authorization" of a TUS. See 16 U.S.C.
§3163 (1982). The rulemaking preamble also suggests that ANILCA did not significantly
reduce the applicant's reporting burden ("each Federal Agency has regulations and informational material which specifies the type of information that must be included in an application.") 51 Fed. Reg. 31,623 (Sept. 4, 1986).
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"reasonable administrative and other costs of EIS preparation". 9' Third,
Interior's regulations allow several extensions of the one year NEPA compliance schedule by postponing the effective submission date of the consolidated application form."' Finally, ANILCA § 1104(e) creates a "good
to extend the time period
cause" exception permitting federal agencies
9
for NEPA compliance in certain situations.
Two different procedures for obtaining federal approval of a TUS application exist. Interior's rules establish separate procedures for approval
the
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When all relevant federal agencies agree that the TUS should be approved, TUS rights-of-way will be issued without further levels of review. 3
If an agency disapproves a TUS that it had the authority to approve,
ANILCA § 1106(a) allows a TUS applicant to appeal to the President. This
unusual Presidential appeal process directs the President to approve the
TUS if, within four months of the filing of the appeal, the President concludes that: (1) the TUS would be in the "public interest"; (2) the TUS
"would be compatible with the purposes for which" the
particular CSU
to be traversed was established; and (3) "no economically feasible and prudent alternative route for the" TUS exists.104 These tests appear to have
been adapted from the wildlife refuge compatibility test of the National
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 and the feasible and
defines applicable law as "any law of general applicability (other than this title) under which"
a federal agency has jurisdiction to authorize a portion of a TUS. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3164(g),
3162(1) (1982). The rulemaking preamble identified the "applicable law" for granting rightsof-way across lands managed by Interior as including: (1) for BLM lands, Title V of FLPMA
(43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1982)) and 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1982); (2) for Fish and Wildlife Service
lands, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1982); 50 C.F.R. H9 29.21 to .22 (1986) (implementing rules); and
(3) for National Park Service lands, 16 U.S.C. §§ 5, 79 (1982); 23 U.S.C. § 317 (1982); 36 C.F.R.
Part 14 (1986) (implementing rules). See 51 Fed. Reg. 31,620 (1986).
ANILCA §1104(g)(2) appears to only supplement existing law by requiring the agency
to consider and "make detailed findings supported by substantial evidence" on the following:
(A) the need for, and economic feasibility of, the transportation or utility
system;
(B) alternative routes and modes of access, including a determination with
respect to whether there is any economically feasible and prudent alternative
to the routing of the system through or within a conservation system unit,
national recreation area, or national conservation area and, if not, whether there
are alternative routes or modes which would result in fewer or less sever adverse
impacts upon the conservation system unit;
(C) the feasibility and impacts of including different transportation or utility systems in the same area;
(D)short- and long-term social, economic, and environmental impacts of
national, State, or local significance, including impacts on fish and wildlife and
their habitat, and on rural, traditional lifestyles;
(E) the impacts, if any, on the national security interests of the United
States, that may result from approval or denial, of the application for a transportation or utility system;
(F) any impacts that would affect the purposes for which the Federal unit
or area concerned was established;
(G) measures which should be instituted to avoid or minimize negative impacts; and
(H) the short- and long-term public values which may be adversely affected
by approval of the transportation or utility system versus the short- and longterm public benefits which may accrue from such approval.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3164(g)(2) 1982). The sufficiency of these additional findings could be challenged in litigation, employing the substantial evidence test called for by ANILCA § 1104(g)(2).
See Sagalkin & Panitch, supra note 84, at 139-40.
103. See ANILCA § 1106(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 3166(a)(1)(A) (1982); 43 C.F.R. §§ 36.7(a),
36.9 (1986).
104. The presidential approval process of ANILCA § 1106(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 3166(a)(2)
(1982) requires the President to override a discretionary agency disapproval if the President
finds "that such approval would be in the public interest and that (1) such system would
be compatible with the purposes for which the unit was established; and (2) there is no...
alternative route for the system.
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prudent alternative standard of the Department of Transportation Act
of 1966.115
A separate set of procedures for evaluating a proposed TUS is triggered when the TUS would traverse Wilderness lands or when the agency otherwise lacks authority to approve a TUS. These procedures require
presidential and congressional approval of the TUS. Under ANILCA §
1105, a federal agency that lacks authority to approve a given TUS under
"applicable law" must first file, within four months after the filing of the
final EIS, recommendations on the compatibility of the TUS with the purposes of the CSU it would traverse and on the existence of economically
feasible and prudent alternative routes for the TUS.'0 Under ANILCA
§ 1106(b)(2), the President then has four months from the receipt of the
agency recommendations to decide whether to recommend approval of
the TUS to the Congress. If the President recommends TUS approval to
the Congress, ANILCA § 1106(c) provides that the TUS shall be considered approved only if the Congress passes a joint resolution of approval
within 120 days of continuous session.1 0 7 If the President does not recommend approval, the applicant has a right of judicial review. That right,
however, may be illusory because the President's review appears to lack
reviewable standards and there may be no law to apply. 0 8
If TUS approval is obtained from the agencies, the President, or the
Congress, ANILCA § 1107 directs the Secretaries of the Interior and
Agriculture to issue necessary rights-of-way over the lands they manage,
while striving to protect important natural resource values "to the maximum extent feasible."' 19 Approval of the TUS under any of these procedures apparently provides all necessary federal authorization for TUS
105. Section (4)(d)(1) of the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966
allows access and other Wildlife Refuge uses when the Secretary of the Interior "determines
that such uses are compatible with the major purposes for which such areas were established."
16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(A) (1982). Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of
1966, as amended, authorizes federally-assisted highways through National Park and Wildlife
Refuge areas only where "there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land."
49 U.S.C. app. § 1653(f) (1982) (repealed by Act approved Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-449,
§ 7(b), 96 Stat. 2413, 2444 (1983)) (revised and reenacted by Act approved Jan. 12, 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-449, § 1(b), 96 Stat. 2413, 2419 (1983) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 303)).
106. ANILCA § 1105; see 16 U.S.C. § 3165 (1982); 43 C.F.R. § 36.7(b)(1)(i} (1986). Interior has defined an "economically feasible and prudent alternative" in terms of being feasible
"to attract capital to finance its construction" and of being prudent from a cost-benefit perspective. 43 C.F.R. § 36.2(h) (1986). "Compatibility" is defined in terms of "not significantly interferling] with... the purposes for which the area was established." 43 C.F.R. § 36.2(f)
(1986) (defining "compatible").
107. See 16 U.S.C. § 3166(c) (1982). If congressional approval is not received under this
joint resolution process, thus TUS approval may require an Act of Congress.
108. Unlike the presidential approval standards of ANILCA § 1106(a) and the agency
recommendation standards of ANILCA § 1105, ANILCA § 1106(b) provides no standards
to guide the President's decision. It merely states that "the President shall decide whether
or not the application for the system concerned should be approved." 16 U.S.C. § 3166(b)(2)
(1982). Consequently, the absence of judicially discoverable standards may render the President's denial decision unreviewable because it is committed to Presidential discretion by
law. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971).
109. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3166(c)(6), 3167 (1982); 43 C.F.R. § 36.9 (1986).
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construction and operation. The stated purpose of the Title XI provisions-to provide "a single comprehensive statutory authority for the approval or disapproval of applications for such systems"- supports this
conclusion."'1
V.

THE CONFLiCT BETWEEN THE

THE ACCESS PROVISIONS OF §§

TUS PROVISIONS AND
1110(b) and 1111

In many situations, both the ANILCA TUS provisions and the separate access provisions of ANILCA §§ 1110(b) and 1111 may apply.
Neither the ANILCA Title XI statutory language nor its legislative history make clear the intended relationship, although Interior's regulations
offer a reasonable compromise. The uncertainty arises from conflicting
clauses making each set of provisions controlling notwithstanding any
other law and from an imprecise definition of "applicable law."
A simple example illustrates this statutory conflict. Suppose that an
inholder within a Wilderness area desires to construct an improved road
to his inholding. Assuming that the inholder qualifies under § 1110(b) and
given that the road constitutes a TUS, the conflict is plain. There are three
possible interpretations of the manner in which the desired access could
be granted.
A. ANILCA § 1110(b) Controls, andANILCA §§ 1101-1107Do Not Apply
Under one interpretation, ANILCA § 1110(b) directs the relevant
Secretary to permit this "adequate and feasible access" forthwith, "[njotwithstanding any other provisions of" ANILCA or other law. Even though
the road also constitutes a TUS under the definition in ANILCA § 1102(4),
compliance with the ANILCA § 1104 arguably is not required as ANILCA
§ 1104(a) supersedes only "applicable law" and ANILCA § 1110(b) is not
"applicable law.""' Under this reading, ANILCA § 1110(b) is a selfcontained provision for access, and a qualified inholder need not comply
with the ANILCA § 1104 application, EIS processing and agency decision procedures.
B. ANILCA §§ 1104 and 1110(b) Apply,
But ANILCA §§ 1105 and 1106 Do Not Apply
Alternatively, Title XI might be interpreted to guarantee access to
the ANILCA § 1110(b) inholder after procedural compliance with ANILCA
§ 1104. Interior has adopted this interpretation. Two legal bases support
110. ANILCA § 1101(c), 16 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1982). This all-encompassing federal approval purpose also is reflected in the legislative history: "ITlhe reported bill makes it clear
that Title XI provides a single comprehensive statutory authority for.., all facets of such
systems." S. REP. No. 413, supra note 28, at 246.
111. ANILCA § 1102(1) provides that the "term 'applicable law' means any law of general
applicability (other than this title)under which any Federal department or agency has [any]
jurisdiction to grant any authorization ... without which a transportation or utility system
cannot, in whole or in part, be established or operated." See 16 U.S.C. § 3162(1) (1982) (emphasis added). Since Congress excluded all of ANILCA Title XI from the definition of "applicable law," and ANILCA §§ 1104 and 1110(b) are both part of Title XI, arguably ANILCA
§ 1104 does not supersede ANILCA § 1110(b).
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Interior's view that the applicant should comply with the procedures contained in ANILCA § 1104: (1) this view represents a proper exercise of
agency discretion in implementing an application and permit system for
granting ANILCA § 11 10(b) access rights; and (2) this view ensures compliance with the § 1104(a) directive that no access authorization has "any
force or effect unless the provisions of this section are complied with."
However, once the applicant complies with § 1104, the agency must issue
the ANILCA § 1110(b) access rather than submit the issue of the Wilderness access to the President and Congress under ANILCA §§ 1105 and
1106. The latter two provisions are expressly superseded since § 1110(b)
directs the Secretary to issue such access "[njotwithstanding any other
provisions of this Act."
C ANILCA §§ 1104-1106 Control and There Is
No ANILCA § 1110(b) Access Guarantee
The third possible reading is that only the President and the Congress
can approve a road in a Wilderness area. Under this reading, ANILCA
§ 1104(g) allows a federal agency to approve the TUS only "in accordance
with applicable law" and, if ANILCA § 1110(b) is excluded from applicable
law, the agency is under no legal requirement to approve the construction of a road in a Wilderness area."' Furthermore, ANILCA § 1106(b)
seems to direct that, where "any application for [a TUS] ... proposes to
.

. . traverse any area within the National Wilderness Preservation

System," only the President and the Congress, exercising their discretion
under ANILCA § 1106, may approve the TUS.13
Thus, three possible and conflicting interpretations exist. Resort to
legislative history to undo this Gordian knot of conflicting interpretations
is of little avail since Congress drafted the TUS provisions and access
guarantee provisions at different times and desired each set of provisions
to be comprehensive and controlling.""
112. ANILCA § 1104(g)(1) provides that "each Federal agency shall make a decision to
approve or disapprove [the proposed TUS], in accordance with applicable law." 16 U.S.C.
§ 3164(g)(1) (1982). The definition of "applicable law" precludes ANILCA § 1110(b) from being a source of authority to approve the TUS. See supra note 111. The only potential source
of "applicable law" to approve the TUS would be the Wilderness Act. Section 4(c) of that
Act, however, generally provides that there shall be "no permanent road within any [Wlilderness area," and § 5(a), as interpreted in the Civiletti Opinion, provides agency discretion
to allow either access or a land exchange. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(c), 1134(a) (1982); see supra note
23. Accordingly, "applicable law" would not require the agency to allow the construction
of a road in a Wilderness area.
113. 16 U.S.C. § 3166(b)(1) (1982). In other words, the TUS provisions seem to allow a
TUS in a Wilderness area only after presidential and congressional approval.
114. For example, the Senate report describes the TUS provisions as providing "a single
comprehensive statutory authority for the approval or disapproval of applications for all
facets of such systems." S. REP. No. 413, supra note 28, at 246. The same Report, however,
states that ANILCA § 1110(b) "directs the Secretary to grant the owner of an inholding
such rights as are necessary to assure adequate access to the inholding .... " Id. at 248.
Further, the access right is not "limited by any right of access granted by... other statutory
provisions .... " Id. at 249. Thus, the legislative history preserves the statutory conflict
that both the TUS provisions and § 1110(b) access guarantees are to be controlling.
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Interior's regulations adopt the second, seemingly reasonable interpretation. In essence, if an applicant seeks an ANILCA § 1110(b) access
method that also constitutes a TUS, the regulations require that the applicant comply with the procedural elements of ANILCA § 1104, but
obligate the federal agency to grant adequate access at the agency level
once the applicant so complies.' 15 This approach fulfills the congressional
intent underlying ANILCA § 1110(b) to provide a statutory assurance
of adequate and feasible access. It also fulfills the intent of ANILCA §
1104 that all TUS components comply with the section's procedures. Finally, Interior's approach provides for NEPA analysis to identify access alternatives which would reduce environmental damage to federal CSU's. 116
VI.

THE

ANILCA

ACCESS AND

TUS

PROVISIONS-

MODELS FOR LEGISLATION APPLICABLE NATIONWIDE?

Although the scope of most ANILCA provisions is limited to Alaska,
the need for access to federal lands is often as critical in other states. Are
the ANILCA provisions unique to Alaska needs, or are they appropriate
models for legislative regulation of access across federal lands in other
states? The following paragraphs explore this question. The authors conclude that the provisions guaranteeing access to inholdings offer the
strongest case for general applicability.
The public policy issue of the proper allocation of rights to private
landowners and federal land conservation interests has become one of the
most contentious and emotional issues in public land law. On one hand,
inholders typically assert that their private property rights cannot be
diminished, either in law or equity, simply because conservation-oriented
federal lands surround their property. They claim that the government
must grant reasonable access and development rights. On the other hand,
conservation interests often contend that stewardship over natural resource values on federal lands must be paramount, and that the government should constrain the privileges of private access and development
where such privileges would conflict with federal conservation objectives.
Although ANILCA primarily served the stewardship objective of the
conservation interests, the inholder interests prevailed on the issue of
specific access guarantees. Congress should consider broadening the scope
of this accommodation of divergent interests by providing a legislative
guarantee for access to inholdings within the parks, wildlife refuges and
Wilderness areas throughout the United States. The equitable claim that
115. The regulations require the applicant for an ANILCA § 1110(b) access method to
use the consolidated application form, and provide that the application "shall be reviewed
and processed in accordance" with the expedited NEPA compliance and agency decisionmaking procedures of 43 C.F.R. §§ 36.5 and 36.6. 43 C.F.R. §§ 36.10(c), -(d) (1986). As long
as the applicant complies procedurally with ANILCA § 1104, however, the regulations direct
the federal agency to grant adequate and feasible access to the ANILCA § 1110(b) inholder,
without presidential and congressional reviews. See 43 C.F.R. § 36.10(e) (1986).
116. Interior's interpretation of an ambiguous, and perhaps conflicting, statutory mandate may be sustainable under decisions such as Citizens to Preserve Spencer County v.
United States EPA, 600 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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inholders should not have their access restricted simply because the
government has designated a CSU around their property seems too compelling to be denied. In certain cases, this claim may even blossom into
a right of access to prevent a deprivation of property." 7
Legislative ratification of inholders' access rights appears desirable
from a number of perspectives. From the private landowner's or lessee's
viewpoint, legislation is the only sure means of confirming the entitlement
to access that is so integral to economic property rights. In the absence
of legislation, the holdings of the Civiletti opinion and the first Ninth Circuit opinion in Montana Wilderness Association that no absolute guarantee of access across federal lands exists may prevail. From the federal
land management perspective, clarifying legislation could eliminate most
troublesome property "taking" litigation and ill-will among CSU neighbors by creating a workable and definite standard for access.
Admittedly, any statutory guarantee of inholder access is not without
its costs in diminished protection of the resource values located on federal
lands. If the access guarantee is to be meaningful to an inholder, it must
go beyond the minimal access level of "sure you can hike to your property" and instead provide access commensurate with the level of economic
development. In many cases, such access may unavoidably degrade the
natural resource values, or diminish the visiting public's psychic enjoyment, of the federal lands; it undoubtedly will complicate the government's
job of managing those lands.
Two partial solutions, both suggested by the Alaska Lands Act, can
be offered for this difficult problem. First, the federal land manager should
have the discretion to choose the access route which minimizes environmental harm. Second, if the risk of damage resulting from mandatory access remains unacceptably high, the government should acquire the inholding by condemnation, negotiated purchase or a land exchange (as provided in ANILCA § 1302).
In sum, a statutory guarantee of inholder access across all categories
of federal lands, similar to the provisions of ANILCA §§ 1110(b) and 1323,
appears appropriate. This suggested nationwide guarantee of access across
federal lands likely should: (1) apply to property right holders (e.g., fee
owners, lessees, permittees) within federal areas; (2) guarantee access sufficient to support the intended private land use; (3) establish an access
by permit system; (4) provide the federal land manager with discretion
to dictate the access route least damaging to federal lands; and (5) require
the inholder to bear all costs for access construction and maintenance.
Although ANILCA's provisions concerning access to inholdings appear to be beneficially transferable to States other than Alaska, other
ANILCA provisions appear unique to Alaska. For instance, the need for
the TUS procedures of ANILCA §§ 1101-1107 is predicated on the
117. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383, 1390-91 (Ct. C1. 1973); Burdess
v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1011
(C.D. Utah. 1979); Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891, 899-901 (Ct. C1. 1959).
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extraordinary extent of CSU and other federal land holdings in Alaska
and on the infant stage of development of Alaska's transportation and
utility networks. Though substantial federal land holdings and the need
for future rights-of-way through them are not entirely absent in the
western States, there does not appear to be a strong present justification
for a complete revamping of rights-of-way permitting procedures outside
Alaska.
Although the wholesale transference of the Alaska Lands Act's TUS
procedures is not recommended, legislative consideration should be given
to the establishment of more uniform standards for the processing of all
forms of rights-of-way. Disparate standards for approving rights-of-way
across CSU's and illogical gaps in authority to approve particular types
of rights-of-way persist. For example, in most instances the National Park
System, the NPS may approve a right-of-way other than a road only if
it finds that the right-of-way "is not incompatible with the public in11
terest.""
In the National Wildlife Refuge System, the right-of-way must
be "compatible with the major purposes"119 of the National Wildlife Refuge
System unit. In the National Wilderness Preservation System, the President must find that approval of the right-of-way will "better serve the
interests of the United States and the people thereof than will its denial." 2 '
In some cases, such as rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines and water
conduits in the National Park System (except for Yosemite and Sequoia
National Parks,) approval authority appears to be totally lacking.''
Objective reasons for this crazy-quilt pattern of differing standards
and gaps in authority are not discernible. Why should the National Park
and Wilderness Preservation Systems be subject to a lesser degree of protection from potentially damaging access under their more liberal public
interest standards-which allow consideration of non-conservation, economic development interests' 2 -than the National Wildlife Refuge System under its standard of compatibility with refuge purposes? Why should
above-ground electrical transmission lines be aesthetically acceptable in
National Parks, while less intrusive underground pipelines are not? Continuance of these historic anomalies does not appear justified.
To eliminate the gaps in statutory authority to approve certain types
of rights-of-way across CSU lands, consideration of legislation to establish
uniform procedures for the approval of any conceivable right-of-way is
recommended. This general authorization could parallel the exhaustive
lists of qualifying rights-of-way contained in ANILCA § 1102(4)(B) and
FLPMA § 501(a). 2 3
118. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5, 79 (1982).
119. Id. § 668dd(d)(1)(B).
120. Id. § 1133(d)(4).

121. See id § 79.
122. Interior construes the "public interest" standard for rights-of-way under id. § 79
as allowing consideration of "the public interest both in and out of the park," including
developmental benefits. City of San Francisco, 36 Interior Dec. 409, 411-13 (1908).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 3162(4)(B) (1982); 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1982).
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The appropriate substantive standard for approval of such rights-ofway presents a more difficult issue. Several alternatives deserve legislative
consideration. One alternative would be to adapt the Alaska Lands Act
approach to TUS's by preserving the approval standards of existing law,
and supplementing a generic standard only where no other approval
authority exists. 2 ' At the other end of the spectrum, a new generic approval standard superseding existing law could be enacted for all CSU's
nationwide. Candidates include the public interest test currently applicable
to national parks and Wilderness areas, the compatibility test currently
applicable to wildlife refuges, or a "not incompatible with the management of a CSU" standard to overcome burden of proof and philosophical
incompatibility problems. 25'
The final issue is whether general legislation similar to ANILCA §
1110(a) would be desirable outside Alaska to open federal lands to certain types of access without requiring a permit. Such legislation would
be premised on a notion of de minimis environmental harm: there are certain minimally damaging access methods, such as airplanes, snowmachines, and horses, that should be authorized generally in CSU's and not
be made subject to permit procedures and the vagaries of administrative
discretion. This premise, however, would be inconsistent with the national
off-road vehicle policy of Executive Order 11644, as amended. E.O. 11644
prohibits the use of most snowmobiles and airplanes within Wilderness
areas, and establishes a presumption against authorization of such access
methods in national parks and wildlife refuges.'26 Furthermore, while the
argument that unregulated access would not cause significant environmental harm might hold true for the sparingly used and expansive CSU's in
Alaska, such may not be the case for the more intensively used and smaller
CSU's in States outside Alaska.12 '
For the above reasons, the authors believe that a provision comparable
to ANILCA § 1110(a) should not be part of any national legislation on
124. See ANILCA § 1105, 16 U.S.C. § 3165 (1982).
125. In other words, an affirmative finding that a right-of-way is "compatible" with the
purposes of a CSU may be more difficult to sustain than a finding that the right-of-way "is
not incompatible" with CSU objectives (for example no evidence suggests the right-of-way
would materially degrade natural resource values). Additionally, phrasing the standard in
terms of practical management considerations, instead of the purposes of the CSU, could
avoid per se incompatibility findings based on the language of the CSU statute, such as the
argument that roads can never be compatible with Wilderness purposes because a Wilderness
area is defined as an area with "no permanent road." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982).
126. Exec. Order No. 11,644, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,989, 3 C.F.R. at 666-69
(1971-1975), 3 C.F.R. at 120-21 (1976-1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app., at 510-11
(1982). Section 3(a)14) of Exec. Order 11,644, as amended, provides:
Areas and trial Ifor off-road vehicle use] shall not be located in officially
designated Wilderness Areas or Primitive Areas. Areas and trails shall be
located in areas of the National Park system, Natural Areas, or National Wildlife
Refuges and Game Ranges only if the respective agency head determines that
off-road vehicle use in such locations will not adversely affect their natural,
aesthetic, or scenic values.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 app., at 511.
127. The conservation and access problems raised by off-road vehicle use in CSU's outside Alaska are illustrated in cases such as Coupland v. Morton, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,504 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,507 (4th Cir. 1975).
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access across federal lands. The better course of action outside Alaska
appears to be continued application of the E.O. 11644 policy to open or
close areas to general off-road vehicle use depending on expected environmental consequences, supplemented by a statutory access guarantee
for CSU inholders who have no other form of adequate ingress and egress.
VII. CONCLUSION

In response to several impediments to securing access across federal
lands, Congress included in the Alaska Lands Act some of the most important and innovative provisions on access and rights-of-way yet enacted.
In §§ 1110(b) and 1323, ANILCA guarantees inholder access across CSU's
in Alaska and the lands of the Forest Service and the BLM. A similar
provision guaranteeing such access nationwide across all federal lands appears to be desirable. Responding to the immature stage of development
of Alaska's transportation and utility systems, ANILCA provides uniform
procedures for obtaining approval of such systems that cross federal lands.
Although a wholesale application of similar procedures nationwide may
be unwarranted, the authors conclude that Congress should establish
uniform procedures and standards for the evaluation of all forms of rightsof-way across federal lands. Until such time as Congress so responds,
Alaska may be the only state where the lament that "you can't get there
from here" does not have an element of truth.
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